그레그 전 대사 <뉴욕타임스>기고, 러시아 천안함 조사결과 MB정권에 큰 타

러시아 천안함 조사결과 밝히면 MB정권에 큰 타격될 것”

그레그 전 대사 <뉴욕타임스> 온라인 기고서 ‘러시아 친구’ 발언 인용

“북 소행이라는 한국 주장에 모든 국제사회가 동의하는건 아냐”
 

 

러시아가 천안함 조사 결과를 공표하지 않는 이유는 조사 결과를 밝히면 이명박 대통령에게 큰 정치적 타격이 될 것을 꺼리기 때문이라는 증언이 나왔다. 도널드 그레그 전 주한 미국 대사는 1일 천안함 침몰 사건과 관련한 <뉴욕타임스> 온라인 기고문에서 ‘러시아 친구’를 인용해 이렇게 밝혔다. 그레그 전 대사는 또 카터 전 미 대통령의 방북을 높이 평가하면서, 이를 통해 북한과 미국 두 나라의 적대적인 현재 관계에 변화가 있기를 희망한다고 밝혔다.

그레그 전 대사는 ‘북한의 반응 살피기’ 라는 제목으로 <뉴욕타임스>와 <인터내셔널 헤럴드 트리뷴>에 기고한 글에서 러시아가 천안함 보고서를 공개하지 않는 이유는 “러시아의 조사 결과가 이명박 대통령에게 큰 정치적 타격을 주고 버락 오바마 대통령을 당황하게 만들 수 있기 때문”이라고 전했다. 그는 지난 6월 한국을 방문해 천안함 침몰 관련 증거물을 검토한 러시아 정부가 조사 결과를 공개하지 않는 이유를 믿을 만한 러시아 친구에게 물은 결과 이런 답변을 얻었다고 밝혔다.

 

그는 자신이 그런 질문을 한 배경에 대해 “천안함과 관련해 추가 대북제재 등 한국과 미국의 강경책이 이어지고 있지만, 문제는 천안함 침몰이 북한의 소행이라는 한국의 주장에 모든 국제사회 성원들이 동의하는 것은 아니다”라는 점을 꼽았다.

 

해군 전문가로 구성된 러시아 조사단은 지난 6월 초 한국을 방문해 자체 조사를 벌인 뒤 천안함 침몰이 북한의 어뢰 공격이 아닌 기뢰 폭발에 의한 것이라는 결론을 내렸다. 또 폭발에 앞서 배가 좌초한 흔적이 있으며 스크루에 엉킨 어망에 걸려 올라온 기뢰가 폭발의 원인이 되었을 가능성이 높다고 지적했다. <한겨레>는 7월27일 이런 내용의 러시아 조사단 보고서(국문 번역 요약본 러시아 “스크루 해저면 접촉 손상뒤 기뢰 건드려 폭발”)를 단독 입수해 보도한 바 있다.

　

그레그 전 대사는 천안함 침몰 사건이 한국과 미국의 강경한 대북제재로 이어지고 있는 상황에도 우려를 표명했다. 그는 “3월26일 한국의 천안함이 서해에서 발생한 불가사의한 상황에서 폭발해 침몰했다”며 “한국 조사단이 북한이 발사한 어뢰에 의해 침몰한 것으로 결론을 내렸고 미국도 이에 동의하면서 대북 제재가 가속화하고 있다”고 지적했다. 그는 한국의 고위 외교관을 인용해 “이명박 정부는 북한으로 통하는 모든 다리를 불태워버렸다. 그리고 출구전략 없는 강경책을 밀어붙이고 있다. 현재의 남북관계는 전통적인 치킨게임을 닮아가고 있다”고 지적했다.

　

그는 미국과 한국의 군사훈련이나 경제적 제재, 비난이 김정일 체제의 붕괴로 이어지진 않을 것이라며, 중국이 그런 일이 일어나는 것을 허용하지 않을 것이라고 지적했다. 중국은 핵무장한 북한을 달갑게 여기진 않지만, 그보다는 한반도의 불안정성을 더욱 우려한다는 것이다. 그는 “평양에 대한 최근의 가중되는 압력은 북한의 중국에 대한 의존성을 강화시킬 것”이라고 지적했다. 그는 그 증거로 최근 김정일 북한 국방위원장의 방중을 꼽았다.

 

그레그 전 대사는 이런 상황에서 곰즈 석방 문제로 방북했던 카터 전 대통령이 오바마 정부의 대북 적대정책을 바꾸는 데 기여할 수 있기를 희망한다고 밝혔다. 그는 “카터 전 대통령이 평양에서 천안함 문제를 논의했는진 알 수 없지만, 그는 김일성 주석과 우호적이고 유용한 대화를 한 전직 대통령으로 존경받고 있다”며 “카터 전 대통령이 북한 지도부로부터 천안함과 관련한 그들의 주장을 들었을 수 있다”고 주장했다. 그는 “카터 전 대통령이 곰즈 이상의 것을 북한에서 가져올 수 있다”며 그의 방북이 평양이 고려할 수 있는 대화의 형식을 찾는 데 조금이나마 긍정적인 영향을 끼칠 수 있다고 분석했다.

 

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Testing North Korean Waters

By DONALD P. GREGG

Published: August 31, 2010

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/01/opinion/01iht-edgregg.html

 

Former President Jimmy Carter deserves great credit for traveling to Pyongyang and securing the release of a U.S. citizen, Aijalon Mahli Gomes, who had been sentenced to eight years in prison for illegally entering North Korea.

 

The Obama administration had gone out of its way to assert that Mr. Carter was on this mission as a private citizen and that he carried no message from the White House. The North Koreans also made clear to Mr. Carter before his departure that he would not be able to meet the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. In fact, Mr. Kim left for China shortly after Mr. Carter’s arrival.

 

Still, the Carter visit may help the White House to soften the hostility of its stance toward Pyongyang, especially since the sinking of a South Korea naval ship last March.

 

Given the difficult agenda he inherited when he came into office, President Barack Obama did not give high priority to dealing with North Korea, whose leaders were seen as obscure and irascible. For example, a suggestion last year that the White House invite Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s youngest son and probable successor, to the United States was not seriously considered.

 

Instead, President Obama formed a strong relationship with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, whom he saw as the dynamic leader of a strong American ally, and was content to let Seoul set the pace in terms of dealing with Pyongyang.

 

Mr. Lee’s policies toward North Korea were considerably tougher than those of his two predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, both of whom met with Kim Jong-il. Mr. Lee, by contrast, cut economic aid to the North and increased pressure for political concessions from Pyongyang.

 

Still, a year ago, it seemed possible that relations between Seoul and Pyongyang might improve. A North Korean delegation to the August 2009 funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung, champion of the “sunshine policy” of engagement with North Korea, was warmly received by President Lee. Later in 2009, North Korea proposed a North-South summit meeting and also invited Kim Dae-jung’s widow to visit Pyongyang.

 

But while these conciliatory gestures by North Korea were still under consideration, on March 26 the South Korean Navy frigate Cheonan exploded and sank under mysterious circumstances in the Yellow Sea just off the coast of the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korean naval vessels have often clashed.

 

A South Korean investigation concluded that the ship was sunk by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine. The United States concurred, and the sinking of the Cheonan came to be viewed in the United States as proof of North Korean infamy.

 

The United States imposed additional sanctions on the North and joined South Korea in staging military exercises of an unprecedented scope on sea and land.

 

One of South Korea’s leading diplomats put it to me this way: “The Lee government has burned all its bridges with North Korea, and has been undertaking hard-line policies with no exit strategy. The current North-South relationship resembles a classic game of chicken.”

 

One problem, however, is that not everybody agrees that the Cheonan was sunk by North Korea. Pyongyang has consistently denied responsibility, and both China and Russia opposed a U.N. Security Council resolution laying blame on North Korea.

 

In June, Russia sent a team of naval experts to look over the evidence upon which the South Korea based its accusations. Though the Russian report has not been made public, detailed reports in South Korean newspapers said the Russians concluded that the ship’s sinking was more likely due to a mine than to a torpedo. They also concluded that the ship had run aground prior to the explosion and apparently had become entangled in a fishnet, which could have dredged up a mine that then blew the ship up.

 

South Korea has not officially referred to the Russian conclusions. When I asked a well-placed Russian friend why the report has not been made public, he replied, “Because it would do much political damage to President Lee Myung-bak and would embarrass President Obama.”

 

Recent statements by senior U.S. officials in Washington have continued to blame the Kims for the sinking of the Cheonan; it was purportedly done to prove the toughness of the ruling family as it prepares for another transition.

 

But whatever the impact of military maneuvers, economic sanctions and verbal attacks might be, those in Washington and Seoul who are hoping for a collapse of the Kim regime are doomed to disappointment. China will not let that happen.

 

China might not be happy with a nuclear-armed North Korea, but it is far more worried by instability on the Korean Peninsula.

Putting further pressure on Pyongyang also only strengthens its dependence on China. The increasing frequency of Kim Jong-il’s trips to China, and the quality of the reception he receives, are clear indications of this trend.

 

American pressures are also likely to instill a mistrust and hostility toward the United States in the mind of Kim Jong-un, who is in his mid-20s and about whom little is known.

 

The disputed interpretations of the sinking of the Cheonan remain central to any effort to reverse course and to get on track toward dealing effectively with North Korea on critical issues such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

 

Details of the South Korean investigation of the Cheonan tragedy have not been made public, and undercurrents of opposition to its conclusions are growing stronger in Seoul.

 

We do not know yet whether Mr. Carter discussed the Cheonan issue while he was in Pyongyang. We do know that the former U.S. president is respected in North Korea for having had a friendly and useful conversation with Kim Il-sung, the first North Korean ruler, in 1994. Thus it is likely that he did hear from North Korean leaders their version of what happened.

 

In my own meetings with North Korean officials over the years, I know them to be frank and articulate in expressing their government’s positions.

 

Thus I believe that Mr. Carter, known for his independence and his willingness to enter into controversy, may well have come back with more than Mr. Gomes. The insights he will have picked up from his talks with top leaders other than Kim Jong-il should coincide with an emerging realization within the Obama administration that its current stance toward the North, featuring sanctions and hostility, is having little positive impact, and that a return to some form of dialogue with Pyongyang needs to be considered.

 

Stephen Bosworth, a former ambassador to Seoul and now the U.S. special envoy for North Korean issues, has long favored more dialogue with Pyongyang. There also is a growing realization in Washington that alienating China is an inordinately high price to pay for putting pressure on Pyongyang.

 

So the White House, in choosing to send Mr. Carter at this time, may deserve credit for seeking to change a hostile stance toward North Korea into a more effective policy.